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Abstract:
It has often been pointed out in the literature that a symbiotic relationship exists between
terrorist groups and the media. As yet, however, no formal model has been built based on this
issue and only very little empirical research has been done in this field. The present
contribution builds a simple game theoretic model, focussing on the social interactions
between terrorists and the media. The model has features of a common-interest-game and
results in multiple equilibria. After a discussion of the policy implications of the model, an
empirical analysis is performed.  Using newspaper coverage, terror incidents and terror
fatalities data, it is shown that media attention and terrorism do mutually Granger cause each
other, as predicted by the model. Moreover, it is explained why terror attacks tend to be
“bloodier” in developing countries than in Europe and the United States.
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3Blood and Ink! The Common-Interest-Game
Between Terrorists and the Media
1. Terrorism and the Media Are Symbiotic
Recent history has provided plenty of examples of mutually beneficial relationships
between terrorist organisations and the media. The hostage taking by Palestinian terrorists at
the 1972 Munich Olympics, the hijacking of TWA flight 847 by Lebanese terrorists in 1985,
or the terrorist attack on New York’s twin towers on 9/11/2001 were all mediated mega-
events, where terrorists deliberately wanted the attention of the public and where the media
benefited from record sales and huge audiences. The more recent terrorist attacks on public
transport services in Madrid in 2004 and in London in 2005 also follow the same pattern.
It appears that political extremists employ terror as a communication strategy, and that
they deliberately choose their targets and their timing in order to maximise media attention.
Most of the time, terror attacks take place in big cities with a high density of press agencies.
Similarly, terrorists tend to attack before or during big media events, such as elections,
international summits like the G8-summit or the Olympic Games. As once expressed by a
leader of the terrorist organisation “United Red Army”: “There is no other way for us. Violent
actions … are shocking. We want to shock people, everywhere … . It is our way of
communicating with the people” (see McKnight, 1974: 168).
Obviously, the media also benefit from the public’s eagerness to obtain information about
terrorist attacks. At least for sensationalist TV channels and tabloid-newspapers, the fear  and
fascination generated by terrorism and political extremism is a substantial part of their
business.
4The relationship between terrorists and the media has received little attention in the
literature. Among the scholars focussing on this issue, almost all agree that a symbiotic
relationship exists between terrorists and the media. Several contributions have discussed this
symbiotic relationship qualitatively with the help of case study evidence (Frey, 1988;
Hoffman, 1998; Wilkinson, 2000; Frey, 2004).
Very few econometric studies have been performed specifically focussing on whether the
media actually increase the risk of terrorism. An interesting article by Nelson and Scott (1992)
assesses empirically whether media coverage causes terrorism for the time period 1968-1984,
and arrives at the conclusion that this is not the case. In the empirical part of our contribution,
we will test, using more recent data, whether this conclusion still holds in today’s more
globalised and media-covered world. Another important empirical paper has been written by
Schbley (2004), who analyses the impact of media on the propensity of Muslim zealots for
terrorism. Analysing interviews with 2619 individuals, it is found that a lot of know-how on
how to organise and execute a terrorist attack is transmitted by the media.
Some other articles put emphasis on related phenomena, such as the psychological impact
of the media coverage of terrorism on the public (Slone, 2000) and on the inaccuracy and non-
representativity of the terrorism coverage of certain media (Delli Carpini and Williams, 1987;
Crelinsten, 1997; Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2004).
However, it is striking that, even though anecdotal and statistical evidence seem to
suggest that there is a link between terrorism and the media, almost no theoretical research
has been done on this issue. One exception is an article by Scott (2001). But he focuses on the
competition amongst different terrorist groups and does not consider the explicit interaction
between media and terrorists.
We intend to fill this gap in the theoretical literature by building a simple game-theoretic
model, which will have the main features of a coordination-game, or, more exactly, a
common-interest-game. As the symbiotic relationship between terrorists and media is a
5particular form of social interaction, a game-theoretic model is more appropriate than a
traditional microeconomics model with independently maximising agents. In section 2 of our
paper, a simple model of the relationship between terrorism and the media is built. Section 3
is devoted to comparative statistics, section 4 performs an empirical analysis and section 5
concludes.
2. A Model of the Interaction Between Terrorism and the
Media
We consider a two-player static game, where the players consist of terrorists and the
media. Terrorists have the choice between committing terror acts and following productive
activities. Their (normalised) time constraint is expressed in equation (1).
(1) L+T=1
where T=time devoted to terrorist activities, L=time devoted to work.
The utility function of the terrorists, which are assumed to be an aggregate player, is
displayed in equation (2). Their utility depends positively on the impact of the terrorist
activity (first term on the right) and on the amount of productive work terrorists could
alternatively engage in (second term on the right).
(2) LQSTuT βα
θ +=
where Q=share of the news of the media devoted to terrorism, S=level of sensationalism
of the newspapers, with 10 ≤≤ S , βθα ,,  are positive parameters, 10 ≤≤θ .
6The marginal productivity of terror incidents on terrorists’ utility is assumed to be
decreasing ( 0>TTU , 0<
T
TTU ). Or, in other words, the higher the intensity of terror, the less
impact and attention in the media an additional terrorist act receives.
Introducing the time constraint (1), the utility function (2) becomes:
(3) )1( TQSTuT −+= βα
θ
As shown in equation (4), the value of the parameter α  depends on several factors related
to intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. The benefits of a terrorist act are increasing with the
value accorded to fame f, power p, monetary compensation m and ideological (missionary)
gains i.
(4) ),,,( impfαα =
with all first derivatives positive.
The media coverage of terrorism acts as a multiplier to the term representing the benefits
from time devoted to terrorism in equation (3). With given preferences for fame, power,
money and ideology, an increase in media coverage increases the terrorists’ motivation by
making them more famous, powerful, wealthy and ideologically influential. This “media
multiplier” of terrorism benefits reflects on the one hand the amount of media coverage
allocated to terrorist news Q, and on the other hand the extent of sensationalism S. The idea is
that more sensationalist newspapers might focus more on catchy issues, such as terrorist
leaders, rather than, for example, on a profound analysis of the underlying roots and problems
in a given context. By assumption, terrorists are not only motivated by intrinsic factors, such
7as ideology, but also place considerable emphasis on extrinsic motivation factors, such as
fame, power or money. Sensationalist media coverage makes it easier for terrorist leaders to
establish their terror organisation as a well-known “brand”, which facilitates fund-raising and
increases their notoriety. As a result, sensationalist type news fits the aims of terrorists better
than a nuanced analysis of terrorism.
The media, which for simplicity are again represented as an aggregate player, face the
choice between reporting about terrorism and covering other topics. Their so-called “space”
constraint is represented by equation (5).
(5) Q+R=1
where R is the newspapers’ share of reports on subjects other than terrorism.
The media benefit from terrorist news and from reports about other topics (equation (6)).
The gains from terrorist news are increasing in the level of sensationalism. The idea here is
that terrorism is a catchy subject from which the sensationalist boulevard press can benefit
more than the serious press. Further, the more terrorist acts that are committed, the greater is
people’s interest in reports about terror. Thus, the benefits from terrorism coverage increase in
T.
(6) RTSQuM δχ
ρ +=
where δρχ ,,  are positive parameters, with 10 ≤≤ ρ .
Which level of sensationalism a given media company chooses depends on the preferred
level of sensationalism of its target group of potential readers. In the present model, the media
8are represented as an aggregate player and the preferences of the public are not modelled
explicitly. Thus, the level of sensationalism can, for the sake of simplicity, be taken as
exogenous to the model. It can be assumed that the overall aggregate level of sensationalism
of the media is determined by factors, such as the educational level of the population (where
education increases the preference for nuanced journalism with a great information content).
The share of news devoted to terrorism shows decreasing marginal returns
( 0>MQU , 0<
M
QQU ). In other words, if numerous articles have already focussed on a particular
terrorist attack, subsequent supplementary articles receive less and less attention. This feature
of the model is consistent with the “crowding”-result of Scott (2001).
Plugging the space constraint of the media (5) in their utility function (6), we obtain
equation (7).
(7) )1( QTSQuM −+= δχ
ρ
The first-order conditions for terrorists and the media can be used to find the respective
reaction functions. Setting 
T
uT
∂
∂  from equation (3) and 
Q
uM
∂
∂  from equation (7) equal to zero,
we obtain the reaction function for the terrorists described by equation (8) and the reaction
function for the media expressed by equation (9).
(8) θ
β
αθ −= 1
1
)(
SQ
T
(9) ρ
δ
χρ −= 1
1
)(
ST
Q
9T and Q cannot exceed 1, as T is subject to the time constraint of the terrorists, and Q is
subject to the space constraint of the media. Therefore, we have T=1 for 1)( 1
1
>−θ
β
αθSQ  and
similarly Q=1 for 1)( 1
1
>−ρ
δ
χρST .
The two reaction functions for particular parameter values1 are displayed in figure 1 with
the time spent on terrorist acts T on the horizontal axis, and the share of news devoted to
terrorism on the vertical axis. The black lines represent the reaction function of the terrorists
T=T(Q), whereas the grey lines represent the reaction functions of the media Q=Q(T).
Figure 1: The reaction functions
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The present framework corresponds to a common-interest-game with (potentially)
multiple equilibria, whereas for some parameter values at least one “good” and one “bad”
equilibrium exists. The number of equilibria depends on the parameter values. In the case of
the dotted reaction functions, there is only one stable “good” equilibrium, namely (0;0): No
                                                           
1 The solid reaction functions in figure 1 correspond to the following parameter values: θ =0.5, α =1, β =0.4,
ρ =0.5, χ =1, δ =0.4, S=1. The dotted ones correspond to the following parameter values: θ =0.5, α =1,
β =0.66, ρ =0.5, χ =1, δ =0.66, S=1.
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terrorism occurs and newspapers do not write about terrorism. Another case (which is not
displayed in figure 1) is when the reaction functions intersect twice at (0;0) and at (1;1).
As illustrated by the solid reaction functions, for some parameter values there are three
equilibria. In addition to the two stable equilibria, (0;0) and (1;1), there is a third, unstable
equilibrium for intermediate values of T and Q. For the particular parameter values chosen as
an example, this equilibrium is at (0.64; 0.64). Figure 2 shows the basins of attraction and the
stable and unstable equilibria for such a case.
Figure 2: The basins of attraction for the case with three equilibria
Equilibrium E2 is a saddle-point, and for points to the left and below E2, dynamic
adjustment leads to equilibrium E1, whereas for points to the right and above E2, adjustment
leads to equilibrium E3.
At first glance, the predictions of the “extreme” values of the stable equilibriums (0;0)
and (1;1) seem unrealistic. However, if we allow for mixed strategies for different periods and
regions, there is a continuous scale of probabilities of ending up at the high terrorism and high
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media attention outcome (1;1) or of achieving the low terrorism and low media coverage
situation (0;0). In other words, with mixed strategies our model is able to predict all kinds of
intermediate levels of terrorism and media attention – just as we observe them in the real
world.
3. Comparative Statistics
In this section, several policy options are discussed. First of all, some policies directly
related to the media are examined.
One policy would be not to attribute terrorist acts to one specific group. This option has
been discussed in Frey (1988, 2004) and in Frey and Lüchinger (2003). The refused
recognition accorded to the terrorist incident would decrease the motivation of the terrorists
by reducing their fame and power. This policy option can therefore be represented by a
decrease in α  in equation (4). This parameter enters the numerator of the terrorists’ reaction
function displayed in equation (8). As shown in equation (10), the first derivative of T with
respect to α  is positive, indicating that a decrease in α  leads to a decrease in the percentage
of time spent on terror attacks, ceteris paribus.
(10) 0)())(
1
1
( 1 >
−
=
∂
∂ −
β
θ
β
αθ
θα
θ
θ
SQSQT
Accordingly, non-attribution of terrorist acts would lead to a rotation of the terrorists’
reaction function towards the north-west in figure 1. As this increases the probability of the
curves intersecting only once, and as it increases the basin of attraction of the (0;0)
equilibrium, this policy leads to a higher probability of ending up at equilibrium (0;0), where
no terrorism occurs and where the media do not write and broadcast about terrorism.
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Another promising policy response to terrorism is represented by the legal or political
support of quality media. Direct subsidies to particular newspapers may not be advisable, as
measuring the quality of all national sources of media appears difficult and costly, and as
direct subsidies could threaten the independence of the media. However, indirect policies,
such as for example reduced charges for postal delivery of newspapers, would be conceivable.
Such a measure is used in Switzerland, where above all “broadsheet”-newspapers are
traditionally accepted and delivered by the post, and where “tabloids” are, in general, bought
at a newspaper stand.
Such indirect support measures increase the incentives of newspapers to decrease their
focus on sensationalist news, S. A lower S would rotate the terrorists’ reaction function to the
north-west, and would rotate the media’s reaction function to the south-east in figure 1.
Similarly, as in the case of the non-attribution policy, subsidising quality newspapers would
increase the probability of ending up at a unique equilibrium of (0;0) and would at the same
time increase the basin of attraction of (0;0). Thus, this policy also increases the likelihood of
ending up in the “good” equilibrium (0;0).
Another way of decreasing the amount of sensationalist media coverage would be to
increase educational spending. If additional education sharpens the faculties of critical
thought and knowledge of politics, the interest for boulevard-journalism is decreased. The
media have less incentive to focus on sensationalist news, and both reaction functions would
rotate in the same way as for the policy of subsidising high-quality journalism described in the
previous paragraph. Thus, educational spending increases the probability of achieving the
low-terror outcome (0;0).
Other policies not directly linked to the media can also be discussed in the present
framework. Decentralisation and federalism tend to increase the likelihood of a desirable
outcome by decreasing the extrinsic motivation of the terrorists. As discussed in Frey (2004)
and Frey and Lüchinger (2004), through decentralisation, the state can decrease its
13
vulnerability with respect to terrorism. The lower vulnerability decreases the power p of the
terrorists and decreases the parameter α . As in the case of non-attribution policy, the lower α
rotates the terrorists’ reaction function towards the north-west, and thus increases the
probability of ending up at (0;0).
Last but not least, better perspectives for terrorists to lead a better life without resorting to
violence can lead to less terrorism. A better outside option increases the opportunity cost of
terrorism. In the present framework, better outside options lead to a higher β . The terrorists’
reaction function is rotated to the north-west in figure 1, which increases the likelihood of
achieving (0;0). Possible ways of improving opportunities in life are to raise educational
spending, provide subsidises for start-up companies, and build up a fairer and more
meritocratic public administration etc.
4. Empirical Results
In order to test the theoretical model, the relationships between monthly data of terrorist
incidents and casualties on the one hand, and of media coverage of terrorist attacks on the
other hand, are analysed.
The data for the monthly number of terrorist incidents and victims are taken from the
National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT). For the purpose of our
study, it is important to include both domestic and international terrorist acts, the time period
being limited from January 1998 to June 2005; prior to 1998, no data on domestic terrorism is
available.
It is impossible to consider the media coverage of terrorism by all newspapers and
television channels in every country. We therefore consider internationally recognised
newspapers as a proxy for the huge number of newspapers and television stations available
around the world. In journalism and communication studies, the concept “quality newspaper”
14
has received considerable attention, even though a clear-cut definition and measurement is
difficult (see Meyer and Kim, 2006). A well-regarded journalism scholar, Merrill (1999), has
performed opinion polls in 1968 and 1999 among leaders in business, politics, science and
culture to rank the world’s highest-quality newspapers. For both waves of polls, the American
New York Times (NYT) ranked first and the Swiss Neue Zürcher Zeitung (NZZ) ranked
second. Our indicator of media coverage has been constructed, using editions of the NYT and
the NZZ for the time period January 1998 to June 2005. We have simply counted the total
number of times the expression “terrorism” or “Terrorismus” appeared during the month in
question.
The NYT has also been chosen because it is one of the most influential high-quality
newspapers in the United States, which has built a reputation for being as objective as
possible. Moreover, the NYT is among the US-newspapers with a strong international
orientation. It seems reasonable to assume that the NYT has a fairly unbiased focus. It is
likely that it matters to terrorists what the citizens and politicians of the United States think.
As the only remaining superpower of the world has a decisive impact on international and
domestic politics in numerous countries, coverage by US-newspapers is likely to be one of the
goals of terrorists in their quest to attract media attention.
The NZZ has been chosen to check the robustness of the results gained from the NYT
because it is an internationally oriented high-quality newspaper, based in Continental Europe.
Moreover, as it is edited in Switzerland, a neutral country without domestic terrorism, it is not
biased towards certain kinds of particular terrorist incidents. It is reasonable to assume that the
NZZ’s coverage is quite unbiased and representative of the terrorism coverage of other
internationally-oriented high-quality newspapers around the world.
Figure 3 plots both the number of terrorist fatalities and the media coverage of terrorism
by the New York Times. There is an important structural break at the time of the terrorist
attack aimed at the New York twin towers on 9/11/2001. After this event, both terrorist
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activity and media coverage remain significantly higher. Following the theoretical framework
developed in section 2, this corresponds with a move from the good to the bad equilibrium.
Initially (1998-2001), there was a low-terror equilibrium with a parsimonious media coverage
of terrorist acts. The attacks of 9/11 massively increased the media interest in terrorism and
the level of media coverage has remained high, even though 9/11 could have been considered
an exceptional catastrophe rather than the beginning of a new trend. Over time, however, the
increased media coverage of terrorism has encouraged terrorists, and a trend of increasing
terrorist activity has emerged. As a result, media coverage remained high. In 2004 and 2005,
both the level of media coverage and terrorism were significantly higher than before 9/11.
Figure 3: Terrorist fatalities and media coverage (monthly data, 1998:01-2005:06)
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Source: MIPT, NYT. Remark: The scale to the left corresponds to the number of fatalities from terrorist
attacks, whereas the scale to the right represents the media coverage of terrorism in the New York Times.
Granger causality tests are used to assess whether terrorist attacks Granger cause media
attention and whether media coverage encourages terror, as suggested in our theoretical
model. It is realistic to assume that the impact time of terror attacks and media coverage is
relatively short. An impact time of a quarter of a year seems reasonable. Therefore, we
perform Granger causality tests with 3 lags.
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The Granger causality test between fatalities and the media coverage of terrorism by the
NYT is displayed in table 1. The null hypothesis of fatalities not causing (in the Granger
sense) media coverage of terror by the NYT is rejected at a level of confidence of 99%. In
other words, at a level of confidence of 99%, terror fatalities cause the media coverage of
terrorism by the NYT, according to the definition of Granger causality. Similarly, the media
attention of the NYT causes terrorist fatalities at a level of confidence of 95%.
Table 1: Granger causality tests for worldwide terror fatalities and media coverage of
terrorism by the NYT
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests
Sample: 1998:01 2005:06
Lags: 3
  Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability
  NYT coverage does not Granger Cause FATALITIES 87 3.557 0.018
  FATALITIES does not Granger Cause NYT coverage 27.441 2.651 e-12
This clear result for terrorism and media attention causing each other is robust with
respect to different lag lengths for the coverage by the NYT. The bilateral causality is
supported using data from the NZZ media coverage of terrorism. This conclusion is robust
with respect to the use of a quality newspaper from Continental Europe, such as the NZZ,
rather than a US-newspaper like the NYT2.
Our findings for data from 1998-2005 contrast with the results of Nelson and Scott
(1992)’s study, which used data on terrorism and media coverage from 1968-1984. They
focus as well on coverage by the NYT as proxy for media coverage. One potential
explanation for differences would be that, in their study, terrorism data was provided by
ITERATE2, whereas our data was provided by the National Memorial Institute for the
                                                           
2 In order to limit the number of tables and to make the present article as reader-friendly as possible, we have
renounced the idea of displaying and discussing the empirical results for the NZZ coverage on terrorism and for
the NYT coverage on terrorism in Western Europe and the United States in detail. However, we would be happy
to share our data and results with other scholars after publication.
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Prevention of Terrorism. However, in our view, it is much more likely that the underlying
reason for the different results is that the world has changed in the last two decades. Our
world has become increasingly globalised and so has international terrorism. In today’s world,
the media play an extremely important role and the world’s leading newspapers are read all
over the planet, both as the printed edition and the online edition. Therefore, the possibility of
gaining media attention can trigger terrorism more than ever.
We have tested whether fatalities in Western Europe and the United States matter more
for the attention of the NYT than fatalities in other parts of the world, such as for example
Africa. We find that the F-statistics for both directions of Granger causality are even higher
for fatalities in Western Europe and the United States than for fatalities worldwide. The
Granger causality relation is significant in both directions at a level of confidence of 99%.
Each terror victim in Western democracies receives more media attention from the NYT than
a similar death in a developing country. Thus, media coverage of terrorism by the NYT has
more appeal for terrorist groups operating in Western Europe and the USA rather than in
developing countries. This bias in the media coverage towards terror attacks in Western
democracies is also found for the NZZ.
It would be interesting to know whether this result also holds for terror incidents (rather
than fatalities) and media coverage by the NYT. There seems to be only a weak bilateral
causality relationship between the number of terror incidents and media coverage. However,
this relationship is stronger for terrorist incidents in Western Europe and the United States. As
shown in table 2, terror incidents in Western Europe and the United States cause (in the
Granger sense) media coverage by the NYT at a level of confidence of 95%. Similarly, media
coverage of terrorism by the NYT causes terrorist incidents in Western Europe and the USA
at a level of confidence of 95%. Again, this result is robust with respect to taking different lag
lengths, or to using media coverage in the NZZ rather than in the NYT. In the case of the
NZZ, the bilateral Granger causality result is also stronger for terror incidents in Western
18
Europe and the USA than for worldwide terrorist incidents, and the Granger causality is also
statistically significant in both directions and for different lag lengths.
Table 2: Granger causality tests for terror incidents in Western Europe and the United
States and media coverage of terrorism by the NYT
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests
Sample: 1998:01 2005:06
Lags: 3
  Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability
  NYT coverage does not Granger Cause INCEUUS 87 2.78595 0.04604
  INCEUUS does not Granger Cause NYT coverage 3.20924 0.0274
These results suggest that even high-quality newspapers like the NYT and the NZZ focus
more on Western countries and under-report terrorist acts in developing countries. For the
number of fatalities, the media’s focus on Western Europe and the USA is less pronounced
than for the number of incidents, where the NYT and the NZZ appear to be mostly interested
in terrorist attacks in Western countries. In other words, to make it into the news, terrorists
operating in Western countries can commit some minor terror incident with few fatalities,
whereas terrorists in developing countries need to “produce” a lot of blood to attract the
attention of the Western media.
As predicted by our model, terrorists may be assumed to adapt their terror strategy with
respect to media behaviour. The terrorists’ main goal is to obtain media attention to expose
their ideology. As Western media might only cover terrorism in developing countries if a high
number of fatalities are involved, terrorist attacks in developing countries should tend to be
bloodier. Figure 4 shows that this is indeed the case. The attacks of 9/11, being a so far unique
event with a large number of deaths, are excluded as outlier from the data used in figure 4.
This figure clearly reveals that, in North America and in Western Europe, terror attacks tend
to involve less fatalities and injuries, whereas in developing countries the number of injuries
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and deaths per terror incident is much higher. Especially in Africa, the most ignored continent
in terms of media coverage, terrorism shows a worrying tendency towards brutality and
bloodiness. More than five people die and over twenty are injured in an average terror
incident.
Figure 4: Ratio between fatalities, injuries and incidents for different regions
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Source: MIPT. Remark: As an outlier, the terror attack on the USA on 9/11 has been excluded.
The empirical analysis presented implies a strong symbiotic relationship between the
media and terrorists. The Granger causality analysis supports the notion that the causality
goes in both directions. Analysing this issue in a game theory framework, rather than by
traditional microeconomic models with independently maximising agents, is therefore
desirable. Models ignoring social interaction would bear the risk of only capturing one
direction of causality and not emphasising the strategic complementarities between the
players.
5. Conclusion
The present contribution emphasises the symbiotic relationship between terrorism and the
media. Terrorist attacks are a particular form of communication by terrorist groups. The
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media are used as a platform for securing a broad dissemination of the terrorists’ ideology.
The media benefit from terrorism, as reports of terror attacks increase newspaper sales and the
number of television viewers. There is a common-interest game, whereby both the media and
terrorists benefit from terrorist incidents and where both parties adjust their actions according
to the actions of their opponent.
The first part of the paper formalises this intuition with the help of a simple common-
interest game. Terrorists have the choice of how much of their time they want to dedicate to
terrorist activities. The media can choose how much of their news space they want to use for
reporting on terrorism. Following the parameter values, one, two or three equilibriums were
found. The extreme cases of very high and very low levels of terrorism and media coverage
were both stable, whereas the intermediate equilibrium was unstable.
The analysis allows us to draw policy recommendations. Avoiding, as far as possible, to
attribute terrorist attacks to particular groups and subsidise (indirectly) high quality journalism
have been found to increase the likelihood of a low terrorism outcome. Further policy options,
such as increased educational spending, more decentralisation and better perspectives for
living a satisfying, law-abiding life could also decrease the risk of terrorism.
The empirical analysis of the media coverage of terrorism, terror incidents and fatalities
in the New York Times and in the Neue Zürcher Zeitung suggests that terrorism and media
coverage of terrorism cause each other in the Granger sense of the word. This result is
consistent with the predictions of our game theoretic model. It remains remarkably robust to
various changes, such as different lag lengths, different newspapers or different regions. The
lower interest of Western media for terrorism in developing countries, rather than in North
America and Western Europe, leads terrorists in developing countries to commit bloodier
terror attacks. Increasing the number of fatalities and injuries is their only possibility of
obtaining the desired media coverage.
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The present contribution uses, and empirically tests, a simple game theoretic model of the
relationship between the media and terrorist groups. To our knowledge, this is the first formal
explanation of the symbiotic relationship between the two groups of actors. There is still
much research to be done in the present field of study. Above all, collecting data on the
percentage of people reading quality newspapers per country, and about the attribution policy
of terror attacks in different countries, would be important.
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